State Action Antitrust Exemption As Applied to Public Utility Regulation: Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 20
January 1980
State Action Antitrust Exemption As Applied to
Public Utility Regulation: Borough of Ellwood City
v. Pennsylvania Power Co
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
State Action Antitrust Exemption As Applied to Public Utility Regulation: Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co, 20 Urb. L.
Ann. 289 (1980)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol20/iss1/13
STATE ACTION ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AS
APPLIED TO PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION:
BOROUGH OF ELLWOOD CITY V.
PENNSYLVANIA POWER CO.
The Sherman Antitrust Act' and the Clayton Act2 articulate a pol-
icy designed to prevent economic concentration through the promo-
tion of small business competition.3 Both Congress and the states
increasingly have substituted administrative regulation for the com-
petitive process.4 Governmentally enforced activities, however,
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Congress designed the Sherman Act as a comprehen-
sive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition
as the rule of trade. See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(railroad's preferential contract clauses amount to unlawful tying agreements). See
generally R.H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978) [hereinafter cited as BORK]; R. SHERMAN, ANTITRUST POLICIES AND ISSUES
(1978) [hereinafter cited as SHERMAN].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976). The Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act, by
arresting in their incipiency those acts and practices which might ripen into a true
suppression of competition. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163
(3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) (Federal Reserve System order inval-
idated as cootrary to purposes of Clayton Act). See also United States v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), af 'd, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) rehearing de-
nied, 343 U.S. 958 (1952) (agreement with restrictive conditions violated the antitrust
laws).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 12(5) (1976).
4. In FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (involving violation of Clay-
ton Act), Justice Jackson asserted that "[the rise of administrative bodies probably
has been the most significant legal trend of the last century." See also Frankfurter,
The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793 (1957)
("Review of administrative action, mainly reflecting enforcement of Federal regula-
tory statutes, constitutes the largest category of the Court's work, comprising one-
third of the total cases decided on the merits.").
Most states now have numerous major agencies, among them public service com-
missions, insurance commissions, workmen's compensation tribunals, zoning agen-
cies, unemployment compensation commissions, departments of agriculture,
departments of labor, occupational licensing agencies, and many others. See Skubel,
Anitrust-Neither State Agency's Appro val of Electric Utility's Tari(nor Fact that Pro-
gram Approved in Tariff Cannot Be Terminated Until New Tariff is Approved Consti-
tutes Sufficient Basisfor mplying Exemptionfrom Antitrust Laws/or that Program, 26
CATH. U. L. REV. 606, 606 (1977); Case Note, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 71, 79 (1974).
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themselves often create a restraint of trade or foster monopolization. 5
Courts have permitted these activities to coexist with the federal anti-
trust laws through development of the state action exemption.6
To qualify for the exemption, the particular action must pursue a
legitimate state interest.7 Courts have applied the exemption in the
5. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW,
MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT. THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT, POLICY AND LAW (1977); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1978).
6. See, e.g., Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th
Cir. 1970) (antitrust laws held not applicable to state-authorized activities); Wain-
wright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (state action
found in activity of Georgia Milk Commission).
The Supreme Court created the concept of the state action exemption in Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), "the decision which opened the eyes of the antitrust bar
to the possibilities of avoiding the impact of the antitrust laws, [through] state action
involve[ment]." Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422
U.S. 659, 663-91 (1975) (expressing the federal correlate to the Parker rule, holding
that the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission to approve or disap-
prove exchange commodity rates, and its exercise of that power, immunized such
rates from antitrust attack).
Express statutory provisions currently exempt certain conduct from the purview of
the federal antitrust laws, if ordered or approved by the appropriate branch of the
federal government. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (Federal Reserve Board); 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976), 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976), 49 U.S.C. § 5(l) (1976) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976), 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), (b)(l) (1976) (Federal Communications Commission); 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976) (United States Maritime Commission); 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (Federal Power Commission, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, and Secretary of Agriculture).
7. A "legitimate state interest" is an area of proper local concern. The state's
regulation of such areas must not discriminate against interstate commerce or other-
wise run afoul of the commerce clause. Inconsistency may not exist between the state
program and any federal regulatory legislation. Nor can a Congressional intent pre-
empt the field. See Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (1972). In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959),
Justice Douglas' majority opinion spoke of the "great leeway [of the states] in provid-
ing safety regulations for all vehicles .. " In that case, however, he viewed the
burdens imposed upon interstate movement'of trucks and trailers as exceeding the
permissible limits of the commerce clause. See also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating a Madison city ordinance prohibiting local sale of pas-
teurized milk that had not been bottled at pre-selected plants within five miles of the
city's center).
State regulations are permissible where they promote local health and safety with-
out creating substantial interference of free economic competition across state lines.
The Court has generally employed a balancing of interests approach in cases of this
nature. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (sus-
[Vol. 20:289
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area of public utility regulation from an early time.' The Supreme
Court has recently reevaluated its proper scope,9 leading to a restric-
tive application of the exemption for activities regulated under public
utility law." In Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power
taining a local air pollution regulation as applied to interstate shipping industry). See
generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) [here-
inafter cited as NOWAK].
8. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1975), cited the regu-
lation of public utility rates as "a classic example of the [state action] exemption."
Referring to governmental rate formulation as "particularly 'sovereign,"' the Jeffrey
court found the utility's disputed rate structure a result of the state's "meaningful
regulation and supervision." (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 1133-34.
In Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972), the Court held that al-
though the rates and practices originated with the electric utility, they emerged as the
products of the Georgia Public Service Commission. The Court stated, "[t]he [state
action exemption] applies to the rates and practices of public utilities enjoying mo-
nopoly status under state policy . . . when their rates and practices are subjected to
meaningful regulation and supervision by the state to the end that they [reflect] the
considered judgment of the state regulatory authority." Id. at 1140. See also
Princeton Community Phone Book v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706 (3rd Cir. 1978) (state action
found in the close relationship between the state and the defendant); Mobilfone v.
Commonwealth Tel. Co., 571 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1978) (federal antitrust policy
subordinated to the state's policy of regulating competition in the radio-telephone-
paging field); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754
(4th Cir. 1973) (state regulatory commission's approval of tariff shielded telephone
company from antitrust liability); Region Properties, Inc. v. Appalachian Power Co.,
368 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Va. 1973) (regulatory commission's silent approval held to
bring power company's tariff filing within the privilege of state action).
9. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
(municipally-operated power companies not exempt from Sherman Act liability de-
spite their status as governmental entities); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (prohibition on attorney advertising approved by Arizona Supreme Court ex-
empt from antitrust laws); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state
regulated utility operating under state-approved tariffs liable for anticompetitive
practice performed under neutral state policy); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule enforced by State Bar subject to antitrust
liability when not issued pursuant to state policy). See also notes 27-42 and accompa-
nying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (Federal
Power Act does not insulate power company from antitrust laws); City of Michawaka
v. Indiana and Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977) (power company's
maintenance of dual rate structure not immune from attack under Sherman Act);
United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) (practice of collective rate publication not within the category of private
activities immune from antitrust laws under state action); Woolen v. Surtran Taxi-
cabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (state action immunity not granted to
private taxicab firm); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 460 F. Supp.
19801
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Co.,"I a federal district court followed this restrictive approach, hold-
ing that state regulation of retail electricity rates does not immunize a
company's wholesale rates from antitrust review. 12
Ellwood City involved two small western Pennsylvania cities. 13
Each created a municipal corporation to provide electric power to
customers within its boundaries.' 4 The municipalities purchased
power from, and competed with Pennsylvania Power Company
(Penn Power).' 5 Plaintiff municipalities alleged that defendant Penn
Power violated the antitrust laws by setting wholesale rates at a level
which impeded the municipalities' competitive ability in the retail
power market.' 6 Penn Power argued that federal' 7 and state'" regu-
1359 (D. Hawaii 1978) (regulation of propane gas not so pervasive as to require anti-
trust immunity).
11. 462 F. Supp. 1343 (W.D. Pa. 1979). The court stayed its decision on this rate-
related issue pending determination of proceedings before the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission (FERC) regarding the defendant's wholesale rates. Id. at 1352.
12. Id. at 1348.
13. The boroughs of Ellwood City and Grove City, Pennsylvania brought this
antitrust action against Penn Power. Id. at 1343.
14. Id. at 1346.
15. Id. at 1344. Electric power companies provide three basic services. They gen-
erate electricity, transmit it to distribution points, and distribute it to consumers. In-
dividual companies may perform any one or more of these functions. To gain
economies of scale, companies often join together to form large "power pools." This
merging of resources allows each power company to compensate for cyclic demand,
thereby reducing its share of excess capacity and eliminating the carrying costs associ-
ated with such excess. Penn Power, a large company providing all three of the basic
industry services, joined with four other power companies to form a power pool. Id.
at 1345.
Due to the prohibitive cost of duplicating the necessary facilities, companies engage
in the distribution of power work within a natural monopoly. Many small distribu-
tion companies are therefore able to purchase bulk power profitably from large gener-
ating facilities for resale to industrial, commercial, and residential customers within
their limited service areas. The plaintiffs offer a common illustration of municipalities
serving their community's need for electric power distribution in this manner. Id. at
1345-46.
For excellent discussions of the competition within the electric industry, see Fair-
man & Scott, Transmission, Power Fools, and Competition in the Electric Utility Indus-
try, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (1977); Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power
Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 64 (1972), cited with
approval by the United States Supreme Court in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (antitrust suit involving power company's activity under
Federal Power Act).
16. 462 F. Supp. at 1345. Penn Power's service area surrounds the plaintiffs' dis-
tribution systems. Consequently, the municipalities must deal with Penn Power for
their supply of bulk power by purchasing either power generated directly by the com-
[Vol. 20:289
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lation of retail utility rates amounted to antitrust immunity. 9 The
pany or power transmitted from a third source through its facilities. Plaintiffs argued
that Penn Power had the ability to control the profitability of the cities' operations,
and that it used its dominant position to their detriment. Id. at 1346. The plaintiffs
brought this action, claiming violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2 (1976), and § 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976), due to a price
squeeze allegedly created by defendant's wholesale rates. 462 F. Supp. at 1344.
The municipalities made three miscellaneous claims: 1) Penn Power refused to
transport power to them from other available sources, thereby effectively precluding
them from obtaining power suppliers other than Penn Power; 2) Penn Power refused
to provide services that would allow the plaintiffs to obtain large commercial custom-
ers; 3) the power company engaged in ratemaking and service policies intended to
lessen the plaintiffs' ability to compete in the retail market with it. Id. at 1345. The
court denied recovery to the plaintiffs on each of these counts. Id. at 1352-54.
17. Congress created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in 1920. In 1935,
Congress empowered the FPC to regulate the construction of hydroelectric projects
and approve the transaction and sale of electric power in interstate commerce by set-
ting just and reasonable rates. Federal Power Act of 1935, § 213, 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)
(1976).
The Supreme Court's 1964 decision in FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S.
205 (1964), extended the FPC's ratemaking authority to the interstate sale of whole-
sale power. In 1977 Congress transferred the ratemaking authority to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Department of Energy Organization Act of
1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7101 (Supp. 1 1977). See Recent Development, 12 IND. L. REv.
637, 638 n.7 (1979). See generally C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES
(1969).
FERC extensively regulates wholesale rates of the utilities within its jurisdiction,
which includes Penn Power. The Supreme Court held that the FPC, the predecessor
of FERC, should consider allegations of anticompetitive rate charges, specifically
price squeeze questitons, in determining a proper wholesale rate for a utility. FPC v.
Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976). See generally Brief for Defendant at 39-40, Bor-
ough of Eliwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
18. A public utility cannot provide service in Pennsylvania unless the Penn-
sylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) has issued a certificate of public conven-
ience authorizing the service. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a) (Purdon 1979).
The state requires PPUC approval of all utility tariff filings prior to their becoming
effective. Id. § 1302. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Code defines a "tarifi" as "[a]ll
schedules of rates, all rules, regulations, practices, or contracts involving any rate or
rates, including contracts for interchange of service .... " Id. § 102. Further, Penn-
sylvania law provides that "[e]very rate made, demanded, or received by any public
utility.. . shall be just and reasonable, and in conformity with regulations or orders
of the commission." Id. § 1301. For an excellent discussion of state regulation of the
electric industry, see A.E. FINDER, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION
(1977).
19. Penn Power established its defense on a tripartite argument. First, according
to Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the state and federal governments' pervasive
regulation of ratemaking, at both the wholesale and retail levels, acts to create immu-
nity from antitrust review of rate decisions. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text
19801
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Ellwood City court held state regulation of retail electricity rates
would not immunize the defendant from antitrust liability for an al-
leged price squeeze2° when wholesale rates lay beyond state jurisdic-
tion.21
Congress enacted the antitrust laws to inhibit monopoly and re-
straint of trade in activities affecting interstate commerce. 22 The
infra. Secondly, Penn Power alleged that a court may not grant antitrust review for
any alleged antitrust violations based on retail rates as set by the PPUC. Thirdly,
FERC's regulation of wholesale rates creates antitrust immunity according to Gordon
v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 462 F. Supp. at 1347.
Penn Power based its second argument on the Supreme Court's decision in FPC v.
Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976). In Conway, a power company sold electricity to
both wholesale and retail customers and competed with its wholesale customers for
industrial sales. The wholesale customers opposed the planned increase in the com-
pany's wholesale rates. Id. at 274-75. The Conway decision expressed the unanimous
view of the Court that FERC had jurisdiction to consider allegations of discrimina-
tory and non-competitive wholesale rates in relation to the company's retail rates. Id.
at 279. The court in Ellwood City did not view Conway as a jurisdictional decision
dispositive of the issue. Thus it did not find an implied repeal of the antitrust laws, as
urged by the power company. 462 F. Supp. at 1349.
20. Courts first used the term "price squeeze" in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416,436 (2d Cir. 1945). The government accused the aluminum
company (Alcoa) of selling raw materials at such a high price that it restricted compe-
tition. The court found that Alcoa, by charging a price higher than a "fair price,"
intended to monopolize the sheet aluminum market. Id. at 437. Alcoa did not give
rise to a succession of antitrust claims based on price squeeze allegations. In fact, no
cases define "price squeeze," as anticompetitive in and of itself. The municipalities in
Ellwood City, however, alleged that the price squeeze created by Penn Power's two
distinct rate structures amounted to an antitrust violation. Penn Power argued that it
is irrational to assert that price squeeze antitrust violations may occur at all, particu-
larly when the producer-seller has no control over prices due to extensive supervision
by regulatory agencies. Brief for Defendant at 34.
21. 462 F. Supp. at 1349. The Ellwood City decision was not dispositive of the
price squeeze-antitrust question, as the court stayed its ruling pending FERC's deter-
mination of the same issue. Id. at 1350.
22. The federal antitrust laws include the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Shernian Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976),
serves a broad purpose. First, it declares contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade to be unlawful. Id. § 1. Secondly, it forbids monopolization, combi-
nations, conspiracies, and attempts to monopolize. Id. § 2. The Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1976), forbids certain discriminations in pricing, services, tying arrangements, and
certain mergers or other acquisitions between corporations. The Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976), declares unfair methods of competition in
commerce to be unlawful. See generally SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AN-
TiTRUST (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN]. For further discussion on the pur-
poses underlying the Sherman and Clayton Acts, see notes I & 2 and accompanying
text supra.
(Vol. 20:289
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Supreme Court has determined that Congress did not intend these
laws to apply to state regulations covering local economic activity.
23
In furtherance of this determination, the Court created the state ac-
tion antitrust exemption.2' The conceptual basis of this exemption
lies in the doctrine of state sovereignty.25 Acknowledging this basis,
lower federal courts have immunized a variety of state regulated pri-
vate activities from the federal antitrust laws.26
23. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker concerned a program es-
tablished by the state Director of Agriculture to prorate and limit the supply of raisins
produced in California in accordance with the California Agricultural Prorate Act.
The proration program required that growers place 70% of their raisin output with the
Department of Agriculture. The Department disposed of the raisins in such a manner
as to raise and stabilize the price. Id. at 347-48. The plaintiff-grower challenged this
program, claiming, among other things, that it violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 348-
49. The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that only purely private endeav-
ors violate the antitrust laws. The Court found the program valid, classifying it as an
action by the State of California, not as an act of private persons. Id. at 350.
Parker cited the legislative history of the Sherman Act as support for its concern
with state sovereignty. 317 U.S. at 351. "No attempt is made to invade the legislative
authority of the several states or even to occupy doubtful grounds. No system of laws
can be devised by Congress alone which would effectively protect the people of the
United States against the evils and oppressions of trusts and monopolies." H.R. REP.
No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1890). See also 21 Cong. Rec. 2600 (1890) (remarks
of Sen. George); 20 Cong. Rec. 1169 (1889) (remarks of Sen. Reagan).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker supports the principle that
states possess the freedom to make their own economic decisions whether or not those
decisions comport with the economic principles favored by the federal judiciary. Id.
at 350. See note 23 supra. The Parker doctrine reflects policies of federalism and
judicial economic neutrality, which counsel against intervention in state regulatory
decisions. See generally Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21
(1972); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Relections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 334 (1975).
26. E.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 438 F.2d
248 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding electric utility practices exempt from the antitrust laws
under the Parker doctrine). In Washington Gas Light, state action was found to exist
when the state regulatory agency failed to disprove the utility's installation program
which resulted in many new residences using electricity rather than natural gas.
Washington Gas Light represents the high water mark of judicial solicitude for state
prerogatives that underlie the state action exemption. The decision illustrates the ex-
tent to which Parker enabled private parties to shield their monopolistic behavior
from the penalties of the antitrust laws by cloaking them in state action garb. Accord,
Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1062 (1972) (state action exemption applied to utility activity which was subject
to meaningful regulation and supervision by state regulatory authority); E. W. Wig-
gins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (airport operation and management considered a valid
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
The Supreme Court severely restricted the scope of the state action
exemption in a recent line of cases.27 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,28 the Court found antitrust immunity exists only when the state,
acting as sovereign, mandates the private monopolistic activity.29
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 30 presented the Court with a private ac-
tion regulated in the public interest. 3' To determine the existence of
governmental function not subject to federal antitrust laws); Miley v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957), af'dmem., 242 F.2d 758 (Ist
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957) (state action found in pervasive regulatory
scheme applicable to insurance industry). See generally Coblentz, Antitrust-Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co- .4 Further Renement of Parker's State Action Exemption, 8 Loy.
CHi. L.J. 619 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Coblentz].
27. See note 9 supra. For thirty-two years, until its 1975 decision in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court had virtually ignored the
issue of the proper scope of the state action exemption through refusal to hear cases
raising it. E., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (natural gas company charged electric companies
with conspiring to eliminate gas as competitive energy source); Woods Exploration
and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (use of governmental processes to accomplish anticom-
petitive advantages over other oil producers does not insulate the activity from anti-
trust liability).
28. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Goldfarb considered a married couple's inability to re-
tain an attorney at a fee less than the minimum prescribed by the county bar associa-
tion. In a class action suit, the plaintiffs alleged that the minimum fee schedule
constituted price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 778.
29. Id. at 791. A unanimous Court held the county bar fee schedule and its en-
forcement had a sufficient effect upon a substantial volume of interstate commerce for
purposes of the antitrust laws. 1d. at 785. Pursuant to the recognized authority of the
state to regulate its professions, the state bar was immune from antitrust liability, but
the state action exemption did not insulate the county bar from the Sherman Act. Id.
at 792.
The Goldfarb Court recognized Virginia's compelling state interest in regulating the
practice of law within its boundaries. The Court refused, however, to grant the state
action exemption, emphasizing that it is gained by state instrumentalities only for
conduct required by the state acting as a sovereign. Id. at 791. Goldfarb stressed that
the "[Sherman] Act was intended to regulate private practices and not to prohibit a
State from imposing a restraint as an act of government." Id. at 788. The finding that
the state did not require defendant's activities may merely represent a judicial deter-
mination that the state had not acted. Viewed in this light, the Goldfarb decision did
not confront the issue of whether the Sherman Act must bow to inconsistent state
regulation.
30. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
31. In Cantor, the owner of a drug store, which sold electrical light bulbs, brought
an antitrust action against an electric utility company. The plaintiff alleged that the
electric utility damaged his business by distributing free light bulbs to residential sub-
scribers in exchange for burnt-out bulbs. Id. at 581.
[Vol. 20:289
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a state mandate, Cantor examined the public and private motivation
and initiative in the program.32 The Court denied the public utility
antitrust immunity, finding the exemption unnecessary to effectuate
the purposes of the regulatory act.33
Further development of this restrictive approach34 occurred in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.35 In Bates, the Supreme Court stated
32. All six justices voting with the majority agreed that the authorization, encour-
agement, participation, or approval of private conduct by the state does not in itself
warrant a finding of state action antitrust exemption. Id. at 592-93.
33. The Court held that neither the existing tariff structure of the electric utility
nor the termination of the light bulb exchange program without commission approval
constituted a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the antitrust laws for
that program. Id. at 598. The majority reasoned that the state had "no independent
regulatory interest" in the utility's light-bulb program. Id. at 597-98.
The Cantor dissent attacked the majority's approach as a judicial usurption of state
legislative prerogatives. The three dissenters argued that allowing the judiciary to
reach an independent determination of the "necessity" of a particular regulatory pro-
vision enabled the Court to make ad hoc evaluations concerning the substantive va-
lidity of state regulatory goals. Id. at 627.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence applied a "rule of reason" analysis, which weighed
the competing federal and state interests. The "rule of reason" calls for immunity
from the federal antitrust laws only where the state can demonstrate that its regula-
tory scheme constitutes a reasonable attempt to promote its health, safety, market
performance, or resource allocation. Id. at 611. The rule does not require a court to
evaluate the equity of the restraint based on its effectiveness in achieving some de-
sired state goal. It also avoids the substantive due process ramifications inherent in
the majority's approach by abstaining from inquiry into the "necessity" of a particu-
lar state provision. Instead, the focus rests purely on whether the state intent served
by the regulatory scheme justifies the subordination of the federal government's inter-
est in the enforcement of its antitrust laws. Id. at 610-11. As stated in Skubel, supra
note 4, "The Blackmun approach would establish a rule that is consistent both with
the federal antitrust laws and the solicitude for state regulatory prerogatives, that un-
derlie the state action exemption." Id. at 619.
34. Several recent cases demonstrate that the state regulatory agency's jurisdiction
must lie sufficiently central to the purposes of the enabling statute in order to permit
immunity from the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (power company not insulated from antitrust
laws through the Federal Power Act); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 348 (1963) (Bank Merger Act of 1960 did not immunize mergers approved
under it from antitrust laws); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 197-206
(Agriculture Marketing Act of 1937 does not bar application of the Sherman Act to
competitive agreements not authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture). See gener-
ally Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 31 REc. oF NYCBA 38, 57-58
(1976); Skubel, supra note 4, at 609.
35. 433 U.S. 350 (1978). Bates involved an action by the state bar against two
attorneys who allegedly violated a disciplinary rule of the Arizona Supreme Court by
advertising their legal services. Id. at 355-56. The United States Supreme Court re-
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three conditions necessary to obtain state action immunity. First, the
defendant must effectively act as a public official or agent. 6 Second,
the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme must depend on granting
the exemption.37 Finally, the regulation must reflect a clear articula-
tion of state policy.38
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.," the
Supreme Court specifically considered application of federal antitrust
laws to municipal regulatory activities.4" In so doing, the Court fur-
ther limited the state action exemption, denying municipalities pro-
tection from antitrust liability when acting solely on their own
mandate.4 The Court held judicial toleration of municipal monop-
oly is proper only when the state directs or authorizes anticompetitive
42actions.
jected the lawyers' claim that the disciplinary rule violated the Sherman Act because
of its tendency to limit competition. Id. at 363. The Court granted state action im-
munity, holding that the rule imposing the restraint reflected an "act of government"
by the state in its sovereign capacity. ld.
36. Id. at 361. This requirement does not demand that the defendant have the
title of a public official or agent, but that he, in effect, act as such. The Court held that
the State Bar of Arizona stood as a public agent, acting under the complete supervi-
sion of the Arizona Supreme Court which adopted and enforced its own rules. Id. at
359-60.
37. Id. at 361-62. Bates viewed regulation of the bar as "the core of the State's
power to protect the public." Id. at 361. In Cantor, on the other hand, the State of
Michigan had no such independent regulatory interest in the market for light bulbs,
Id.
38. Id. at 362. The Bates Court considered the Arizona disciplinary rules a clear
articulation of that state's policy with regard to professional behavior. Id. The Court
saw no articulation of an analogous state policy in the state approved activity of the
private entity in Cantor. The utility alone possessed the freedom to undertake the
light bulb program. The state in no way compelled the activity. (d.
39. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
40. In City ofLafayette, plaintiffs, two Louisiana cities, moved to dismiss a coun-
terclaim which alleged certain antitrust violations. The plaintiffs contended that the
state action exemption withdrew the municipalities' action from the scope of Sherman
Act liability. Id. at 392. The Supreme Court rejected this claim, finding no implied
exclusion of cities as municipal utility operators from coverage under the antitrust
laws. Id. at 398-409.
41. Id. at 414. In this regard, the Court stated: "When cities, each of the same
status under state law, are equally free to approach a policy decision in their own
way, the anticompetitive restraints adopted as policy by one of them may express its
own preference, rather than that of the State." Id.
42. Id. at 413. The Court acknowledged that a finding of state action immunity
might result where the cities act "pursuant to [a] state policy to displace competition
with regulation of monopoly public service." Id.
[Vol. 20:289
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol20/iss1/13
UTILITIES ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Most lower federal courts have applied the Supreme Court's three-
pronged analysis of the state action exemption.43 The Third Circuit,
however, established a different test in Mobil/one v. Commonwealth
Telephone Co. " The Mobilfone test, like the one in Bates, grants
state action immunity upon a finding of three elements. First, the
defendant must demonstrate an independent state interest in the sub-
ject of the regulation. Second, the regulation must clearly and affirm-
atively articulate the state's interest. Finally, the state must actively
supervise and participate in the regulation.45
Two district courts within the Third Circuit have recently applied
the Mobifone test, arriving at conflicting holdings in factually similar
cases.46 In City of Newark v. Delmarva Power and Light Co. ,47 the
43. See, e.g., Industrial Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui and Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979)
(state action doctrine does not preclude Sherman Act from regulating labor industry's
anticompetitive activities); Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 571
F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978) (issue of the extent of the state's interest in its bar associa-
tion's activity remains in light of Goldfarb and Bates); United States v. Southern Mo-
tor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (collective rate
publication practice not within state action exemption).
44. 571 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1978). The Mobilfone court based its test on the
Supreme Court decisions in Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates. Id. at 143-44. The court
noted that only four Supreme Court justices-not a majority-specifically restricted
application of the state action exemption to suits against public officials or agents. Id.
at 144.
45. Id. at 144.
46. Both of the district court cases involved municipal corporations which, due to
the economics of the electric industry, simultaneously purchased power from and
competed with the defendant power companies. The municipalities alleged a price
squeeze resulting from a lack of coordination between the power companies' whole-
sale and retail rate structures. FERC regulated the defendants' wholesale rates,
whereas the state regulatory commissions controlled retail rates. See generally notes
17 & 18 supra.
47. 467 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1979). In City of Newark, several municipalities
both purchased power wholesale from Delmarva Power and Light Company
(Delmarva), and competed with it in the retail market. Id. at 765. The municipalities
alleged that Delmarva violated both the Sherman and the Clayton Acts, by conspiring
to monopolize interstate trade and commerce in the wholesale and retail distribution
of electricity, and by imposing unreasonable restraints on interstate trade and com-
merce in the sale of electricity. Id.
Delmarva cited FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271 (1976), in support of a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See generally note 17 supra. The City of Newark
court, however, denied defendant's motion, stressing the essentiality of maintaining
available antitrust relief in that forum. The court noted that:
[Nieither the [FERCI nor the [state regulating authority] have full authority over
the relationship between a utility's retail and wholesale rates. [W]hile the
[FERCI can consider that relationship, it cannot afford a complete remedy in
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Delaware District Court granted state action immunity to a power
company.48 Holding that the facts satisfactorily met the appellate
court's first two criteria,49 the court found active state supervision de-
spite the state utility commission's lack of authority to regulate the
wholesale rates that allegedly created the price squeeze.50
In Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., the District
Court for Western Pennsylvania refused to grant antitrust immu-
nity."1 Without commenting on the first two criteria in the appellate
court's test, the court held that absence of state regulation over
wholesale rates necessarily implies a want of active state supervi-
sion. 2 The Ellwood City court further based its decision on Cantor,53
which balanced state regulation and federal antitrust law to deter-
cases where the retail rate is so low that a price squeeze would continue to exist
with the wholesale rate reduced to the lowest boundary of reasonableness.
467 F. Supp. at 768. See also City of Mishawaka v. Indiana and Mich. Elec. Co., 560
F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977) (availability stressed for all forms of antitrust relief in a
price squeeze situation).
48. 467 F. Supp. at 766-68. The City of/Newark decision does not reflect a final
determination of the price squeeze-antitrust issue raised. The court stayed its ruling
pending the outcome of a FERC hearing on the same issue.
49. The City ofNewark court found that Delaware had both an interest in protect-
ing its citizens from unreasonably high or discriminatory rates and in maintaining the
financial fitness of its public utilities so that they will remain capable of delivering the
energy its citizens require. Id. at 767. The court also found a clearly articulated state
policy with respect to these interests. 1d.
50. Id. at 769. The court liberally construed the Mobilfone criterion of active state
supervision, viewing it as an expression of Congress' desire that the antitrust laws not
interfere with "activity authorized by a state in active pursuit of an established state
policy." Id. Having recognized regulation of a public utility's retail rates as "a legiti-
mate exercise of state authority," the court granted antitrust immunity to the power
company. Id.
51. 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (W.D. Pa. 1979). The Ellwood City court took a dif-
ferent view of FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271 (1976), than had the City of Newark
court. See note 47 supra. Ellwood City, citing Conway, held that the jurisdiction of
FERC over defendant's wholesale rates did not require an implication of state action
immunity. "iThere is adequate variance in the zone within which wholesale rates
may be set as to enable the [FERCI to set a rate which would ameliorate the condition
of wholesale customers subject to the price squeeze." 462 F. Supp. at 1349.
52. 462 F. Supp. at 1349. In rejecting the defendant's claim of state action immu-
nity, the Ellwood City court stated, "[S]ince wholesale rates are not within the PPUC
purview, at least the third element of the Mobitfone holding, active supervision, is
necessarily absent. Mobifone, therefore, supports plaintiffs' position and not that of
Penn Power. Parker immunity based on state regulation is absent." ld. at 1348-49.
53. Id. at 1348.
[Vol. 20:289
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol20/iss1/13
UTILITIES ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
mine the propriety of a state action immunity grant.54 The Ellwood
City court deemed an exemption unwarranted, as the wholesale rates
creating the alleged price squeeze fell outside the purview of the state
regulatory scheme."
The district court's holding in Ellwood City, like the Supreme
Court's recent rulings,56 limits application of the state action exemp-
tion in the area of public utility regulation. The Supreme Court deci-
sions deny state action antitrust immunity to a public utility by
requiring, inter alia, that the private defendant in the antitrust suit act
as a public official or agent. 7 The Third Circuit's test sets forth no
such requirement, but calls instead for a finding of active state super-
vision.' The Ellwood City court narrowly construed this supervision
requirement, by refusing an exemption when the private power com-
pany retains a sufficient role in the decisionmaking process.5 9 Con-
versely, the court in City of Newark liberally construed the state
supervision criterion, acknowledging that state regulation of utilities
through a public commission itself clearly constitutes state action.60
The Ellwood City court's narrow interpretation of the state supervi-
sion criterion eliminates state action antitrust immunity for public
54. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976). See notes 32-33 and
accompanying text supra.
55. 462 F. Supp. at 1348. See note 67 infra.
56. See note 9 supra.
57. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra. The Supreme Court's analysis fo-
cuses on the particular defendant's status and function. Thus, it denies state action
immunity to utilities on the basis that power companies represent a form of private
enterprise. The Third Circuit test centers on the supervisory role of the state. This
approach provides public utilities the opportunity for state action antitrust immunity
when the state actively regulates the industry. The mode of analysis employed by the
appellate court is more in tune with the reality of the electric power industry. Power
utilities and state regulatory commissions often work together for the promotion of
public welfare. See text accompanying notes 36-38 & 44-45 supra. See generally
Coblentz, supra note 26.
59. The court narrowly construed the strict supervision requirement of the
Mobilone test, so as to bring their decision in line with Cantor. In so doing, it re-
quired a finding of active state supervision over the wholesale rates in particular,
rather than over the rate structure in general. As the court found the wholesale rates
under the purview of FERC, not the PPUC, it refused the power company state ac-
tion exemption from the federal antitrust laws. 462 F. Supp. at 1348-49. See notes
51-55 and accompanying text supra.
60. 467 F. Supp. 763, 769 (D. Del. 1979). See note 50 supra.
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utilities at the slightest finding of private activity.6 As a natural con-
sequence, utilities will withhold their expertise from the regulatory
commissions, fearing incurrence of Sherman Act liability.62 Such
conduct will necessarily inhibit the performance of state commissions
which, due to the technical nature of the industry,63 must depend
upon participation by the utilities.' Withdrawal of private expertise
thus imperils continued effective regulation of the electric utility in-
dustry.
The Ellwood City approach presents two inherent difficulties.
First, it provides the federal judiciary an opportunity to evaluate the
"necessity" of a particular state provision.61 The City ofNewark ap-
61. To the Ellwood City court, the lack of complete state control in the regulation
of the public utility's rate structure dismissed the issue of a possible state action ex-
emption. 462 F. Supp. at 1348-49. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
The court's construction of the "active state supervision" requirement, id., presented a
stricter challenge to a grant of state action immunity than the Supreme Court had
offered in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1978). The Bates Court based
state action immunity on a finding that the Arizona State Bar acted as an agent for the
state, controlled through the Arizona.Supreme Court. Id. at 361. See note 36 and
accompanyng text supra. Bates, however, granted immunity to the State Bar, even
though it had a hand in controlling its own operations.
62. By excluding private companies from the state action exemption when they
maintain enough of a role in decisionmaking, the Ellwood City court's ruling may
penalize the right of the public utility companies to propose suggested tariff filings to
the regulatory agencies. Justice Stewart suggested such consequences would result
from the Supreme Court's decision in Cantor, stating that private businesses subject
to state regulation would refuse to participate in the regulatory process due to the
threat of treble damage liability under the Clayton Act. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. at 627.
63. For a general summary of the nature of the electric power industry, see note
15 supra.
64. The electric industry must constantly adapt iis equipment, services, and proce-
dures to meet the changing demands of the energy consuming public. Open and con-
stant lines of communication must therefore exist between the regulatory commission
and the utilities. See .Coblentz, supra note 26, at 639.
65. This approach seems similar to the federal courts' expansive review of state
legislation during the "Substantive Due Process Era." From 1900 to 1934, the
Supreme Court did not defer to the opinion of other government branches regarding
the legitimate ends of legislation or the proper means of achieving those ends. See,
e.g., Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (fixing the weight of loaves
of bread); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (setting minimum wages
for women); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (outlawing "yellow dog" labor
contracts).
In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court revealed, for the first time,
a willingness to shift its thinking with respect to state economic legislation. Today,
the Court allows other government branches great latitude in dealing with issues of
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proach avoids such inquiry into the reasonableness of state action,
employing a "rule of reason" test designed to balance the competing
federal and state interests.' Second, in Ellwood City, two distinct
regulatory commissions separately controlled the public utility's rate
structure.67 In such cases, the defendant utility has neither responsi-
bility nor any direct control over price squeezes allegedly resulting
from a lack of coordination between the rates approved by the two
regulatory bodies. The Supreme Court has recognized the basic un-
fairness of imposing Sherman Act liability on such defendants.68
Ellwood City continues the Supreme Court's limitation of the state
action antitrust exemption as applied to public utility regulations.69
The district court's strict application of the active state supervision
requirement denies antitrust immunity to public utilities in price
squeeze claims.7" The decision in City of Newark illustrates that the
issue of proper application of the state action exemption remains an
active one.71 Until the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court offers a
economic and social welfare. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (uphold-
ing Kansas statute prohibiting non-lawyers from engaging in business of debt adjust-
ing); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (upholding Nebraska statute limiting
maximum fee of private employment agencies); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of
adulterated milk). See also NOWAK, supra note 7, at 397-410.
66. See note 33 supra.
67. In Ellwood City, FERC regulated the power company's wholesale rates, while
the PPUC supervised its retail rates. See notes 17 and 18 supra.
68. Cantor recognized "fairness" as a proper defense against the imposition of
treble damages where the regulation increases the likelihood of antitrust violation or
where the defendant relies upon a justified understanding of immunity. 428 U.S. at
599-600. The Court noted the Sherman Act's intention to exempt state-regulated util-
ities only to the extent of compliance with state rules regulating natural monopoly
powers, as opposed to business activity in competitive areas of the economy. Id. at
593. It reasoned that where "the private party exercise(s) sufficient freedom of
choice," courts should conclude that the party "be held responsible for the conse-
quences of his decision." Id. The decision thus holds that where a party lacks the
requisite freedom of choice in his actions due to comprehensive public regulation, no
Sherman Act liability should ensue.
69. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the scope
of the exemption, See notes 27-42 and accompanying text supra.
70. Ellwood City required a finding of active state supervision in the activity spe-
cifically charged as creating the antitrust violation. 462 F. Supp. at 1348-49. In price
squeeze cases, this may impliedly eliminate antitrust immunity, as the wholesale rates,
allegedly creating the anticompetitive effect, rest outside the state's regulatory juris-
diction. See notes 52, 59, 61 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 50 & 61 and accompanying text upra.
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dispositive ruling on this issue, public utilities will act without full
knowledge of the possible antitrust consequences inherent in their ac-
tions.72
Barry Jay Kessler
72. The Ellwood City court denied state action antitrust immunity to a public util-
ity charging state approved rates. The Supreme Court has yet to extend its narrowing
of the state action exemption to such an extreme degree. The Cantor decision in-
volved a state approved act of a public utility ancillary to its primary function and
purpose. Professor Skubel, commenting on Cantor, noted that it appeared "doubtful
that the Court [had] intend[ed] the decision to apply to pervasive state regulatory
schemes." Skubel, supra note 4, at 619.
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